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DRAFT
September 14, 1989
EXISTING LEGAL TREATMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
DIFFERENTIAL, CONTEXTUAL, AND ABSOLUTE NORMS
by Daniel Barstow Magraw 
Associate Professor of Law 
University of Colorado*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Analytic Framework: Types of Norms
The treatment and role of developing countries^ arise in 
virtually every discussion of international environmental 
protection and resource management. These serious and difficult 
issues must be confronted successfully in order to realize 
effective international solutions. This paper analyzes the 
existing international legal regime regarding those issues.
For purposes of this paper, there are, generally speaking, 
three types of treatment that international law can provide 
developing countries. The first is what I refer to as 
"differential" treatment, by which I mean treatment according to 
a norm that on its face provides different, presumably more 
advantageous, standards for developing countries than for 
developed countries. An example of a differential norm is that 
contained in the 1985 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, which allows developed countries 5 years 
to decrease pollution to a specified level, but developing 
countries 10 years to reach that same level.̂
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The second type of treatment is what I refer to as ^
"contextual" treatment, by which I mean treatment according to a 
norm that on its face provides identical treatment to developing 
and developed countries but the application of which requires (or 
at least permits) consideration of factors that might vary from 
country to country and that correspond typically, but not 
unvaryingly, to the development level of a country. An example 
of a contextual norm is the World Heritage Convention's 
requirement that a country, in protecting natural and cultural 
heritage, "do all it can to this end, to the utmost of its
■3resources."J
The third type of treatment is what I refer to as "absolute" 
treatment, by which I mean treatment according to a norm that 
provides identical treatment to developed and developing <
countries and which does not require or permit consideration of 
factors that vary between countries. An example of an absolute 
norm is the 1987 Nuclear Accident Notification Convention's 
requirement of immediate notification of pending transboundary 
harm.
This paper examines existing international norms with 
respect to the extent to which they require or otherwise provide 
a basis for according these different types of treatment to 
developing countries.
B. Non-legal Considerations
Before addressing those questions, it is useful to mention 
some related approaches that one can take to thinking about the
€
2
treatment of developing countries with respect to environmental 
norms.
From a political perspective, there are two points to note. 
First, at the international level, developing countries comprise 
more than a majority of the world's approximately 165 countries, 
and they contain more than three-quarters of the world's 
population. Developing countries are significant to developed 
countries such as the United States in many arenas not expressly 
involving the environment. I will not dwell on this aspect, but 
will only note the obvious: developing countries' claims can not
be ignored.
The second point to make about political considerations 
concerns the domestic level. Political leaders in developing 
countries face tremendous pressures to accomplish short-term 
economic development, even if that involves sacrificing the 
environment. The importance of "sustainable development," as 
that term is used in the Report of the Brundtland Commission,^ 
and the dependence of long-term economic development on 
environmental protection are increasingly accepted by developing- 
country leaders. But that recognition has not yet spread to the 
masses. Until it does (and perhaps even thereafter), impatience 
and resultant political pressure will be the rule. In the 
absence of special incentives, expecting that developing-country 
political leaders will surmount that pressure in the interests of 
the global environment, or even their own country's sustainable 
development, is probably naive.
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From a practical (non-political) perspective, developing
1 r
countries are the source of much of the world's pollution and 
contain much of the world's population and natural resources. 
International environmental measures thus must involve the 
continued participation of developing countries in order to be 
effective. Equally significant, but with different implications, 
is the reality that developing countries face greater 
difficulties than do developed countries with respect to managing 
environmental problems. Developing countries may not have 
sufficient information to predict the potential for transboundary 
harm created by activities within its territory of foreign or 
foreign-owned entities because the country may not receive full 
information from such an entity. A developing country may not 
have sufficient technical expertise to evaluate complex ,
technological proposals or to monitor on-going performance, 
especially (as is often the case) where control of the day-to-day 
operations is effectively in the hands of foreigners. A 
developing country may lack regulatory and administrative skills 
necessary to effectuate pollution-control laws, or may not have 
the legislative-drafting skills and experience necessary to draft 
adequate laws. Moreover, developing countries may face an 
unusually high risk of suffering transboundary harm from ill- 
planned or hazardous activities of neighbors, because the 
neighboring countries are typically developing countries and 
because the governments or people of the affected developing 
country are typically not as aware of the potential harm, or as 
able to detect, monitor, or remedy such harm.
4
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From a moral perspective, an urgent and undeniable 
imperative exists that the standard of living of the world's 
poorest people be improved. Roughly one billion people live in 
what Robert McNamara has described as "absolute poverty," that 
is, in a form of existence so characterized by malnutrition, 
exposure to the elements, disease, and illiteracy, that it is 
below any reasonable standard of human decency.5 The moral 
imperative to alleviate absolute poverty has profound 
implications for international environmental law. On the one 
hand, it means that the situation international law must deal 
with is more complicated and threatening: improving the absolute
poor's standard of living will inevitably require increased 
energy use and greater demands on natural resources. On the 
other hand, the moral imperative places a constraint on the means 
international law can use to deal with that worsening situation: 
environmental norms must be structured so as to minimize 
interference with the effort to lift people from absolute 
poverty.
Moral philosophy may also have other implications regarding 
the extent to which developing and developed countries should be 
subject to the same international environmental standards. One 
might make an argument based on the philosophy of John Locke 
(1632-1704) that developing countries are not entitled to any 
differential treatment. The Lockean principle of acquisition 
from a commons permits one to appropriate or use a resource 
provided that one does not take more than one can use without 
waste and that after one's acquisition there is "enough, and as
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good left in common for others."^ How much it is permissible to ^
take will depend on how many others want to use the resource and 
on how much they are likely to need or want. Presumably the 
Lockean principle covers using an area like the sea as a disposal 
site. If there are only a few other polluters around, say, the 
Mediterranean, and if they are only likely to want to put small 
amounts of pollutants into the sea, then country A may be able to 
put in a large amount of pollutant (call this amount N) without 
violating the Lockean condition. Later, when there are many more 
countries putting pollutants into the Mediterranean, another 
country B may not be able to dispose of an amount as large as N 
without running afoul of the Lockean proviso. Country B then has 
no complaint that A used to be able to dispose the greater amount 
N, or that A was able to dispose a greater aggregate amount over 
time by having an earlier need for disposal.
The Lockean proviso, however, cuts in the other direction as 
well. Suppose that A continues to dispose of amount N every year 
even while new polluters in order to avoid violating the Lockean 
proviso have to dispose of less than N per year. Here the newer 
polluters have grounds to complain that there is no longer any 
basis for A's claim that it is entitled to dispose of amount N.
A, like the other polluters, is only entitled to contribute an 
amount that takes into account the number of parties wanting to 
make use of the commons.
Consider this problem in a real case. Many scientists think 
that uncontrolled forest burning in the Western part of Brazil 
contributes a significant amount to global warming. Countries
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that industrialized earlier than Brazil and whose fossil fuel use 
contributes much of the rest of the problem, might complain that 
Brazil cannot make this large deposition of carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere without violating the Lockean proviso. Surely 
this would be correct. But Brazil would also be correct in 
responding that other countries can no longer put as much carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere as they were once free to do. Brazil 
would be correct, that is, in appealing to the Lockean proviso in 
demanding that cuts be multilateral rather than limited to Brazil 
alone.
But might Brazil be able to use Locke to argue further that 
developed countries should cut back more than Brazil, on the 
grounds that the need to develop economically (or to benefit 
Brazil's absolute poor) should be considered in determining what 
is "enough"? Such an argument would be buttressed by moral 
conclusions drawn from the imperative to improve the standard of 
living of those living in absolute poverty, from a philosophical 
approach that generally favors access to resources based on need 
(Brazil's needs are greater than those of developed countries), 
from a philosophical approach centered on ability (developed 
countries generally have more resources and technical capacity to 
combat international environmental degradation than Brazil has), 
or from a philosophical approach that emphasizes who caused the 
problem in question (anthropogenic activities in developed 
countries have historically contributed more to global warming 
than have anthropogenic activities in Brazil).
7
This article is not the appropriate place for a full
if
exploration of the problems of fairness between developing and 
developed countries in distributing the burdens of dealing with 
transboundary environmental problems. But it is appropriate to 
assert that these fairness issues will have to be taken 
seriously, and that it will not be plausible for developed 
countries to insist that they should be allowed to continue 
contributing as much pollution as they did just because they 
started doing it first.
C. Organization of This Article
One hopes, of course, for a consonance between the 
international legal regime -- as it presently exists and as it 
evolves in the future -- and the political, practical, and moral 
considerations just mentioned. The remainder of this article it
examines the existing international legal regime with respect to 
the two types of treatment mentioned above -- differential 
treatment and contextual treatment. The discussion is organized 
as follows. Part II examines the efforts to promote economic 
development and to protect international human rights. Part III 
examines four customary international environmental law 
principles: reasonable and equitable use of a shared natural
resource; state responsibility for causing significant injury to 
another state's environment or to global commons; the duty to 
cooperate; and the duty to compensate for transboundary harm even 
when the activity causing the harm is permitted to continue by 
international law. Part IV examines six conventional regimes
t
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dealing with transboundary environmental problems. Part V 
contains the Conclusion.
II. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS
The major post-World War II efforts to promote economic 
development, to protect the environment, and to foster 
international human rights are related on many levels. At a 
substantive level, all three share a concern for health and 
safety, and all three are primarily directed at benefiting 
individuals, rather than states. The following discussion 
explores whether the economic-development and human-rights 
efforts also share a common concern for developing countries in 
the context of environmental protection and, if so, how that 
concern is expressed normatively.
A. Efforts to Promote Economic Development
Efforts to promote economic development began in earnest 
immediately after World War II, with references to improved 
standards of living in the United Nation's Charter and the 
formation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. These efforts were followed, in 1974, by the formal 
call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The call for 
NIEO was contained in three United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions: the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order; the Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order;® and the
9
TheCharter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS).^ 
thrust of NIEO is that the Third World must develop, that the gap 
between the developed and the developing countries must narrow, 
and that there should be a transfer of resources from the 
developed countries to the developing countries to accomplish 
those ends. NIEO is thus firmly based on the notion of 
differential treatment of developing countries. Moreover, each 
of the three basic documents expressly states that developing 
countries should be treated in a beneficial manner.^ Most 
significantly, article 30 of CERDS expressly requires 
differential treatment in the context of state responsibility for 
protecting the environment:
The protection, preservation and enhancement of the 
environment for the present and future generations is the 
responsibility of all States. All States shall endeavour to 
establish their own environmental and developmental policies 
in conformity with such responsibility. The environmental 
policies of all States should enhance and not adversely 
affect the present and future development potential of 
developing countries, All States have the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control 
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. All 
States should co-operate in evolving international norms and 
regulations in the field of the environment.
NIEO also contains elements of contextual treatment. Each
of the three basic NIEO resolutions repeatedly refers to "equity"
1 1and "equitable." J As is evident from many opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, including the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases^ and the Tunisia-Libya continntal shelf 
case, these concepts require consideration of the facts and 
circumstances of the particular situation under examination. As
4
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Judge Jimenez de Ar6chaga stated in an individual opinion in the 
Tunisia-Libya case:16
To resort to equity means, in effect, to appreciate and 
balance the relevant circumstances of the case, so as to 
render justice, not through the rigid application of general 
rules and principles and of formal legal concepts, but 
through an adaptation and adjustment of such principles, 
rules and concepts to the facts, realities and circumstances 
of each case.... In other words, the judicial application 
of equitable principles means that a court should render 
justice in the concrete case, by means of a decision shaped 
by and adjusted to the relevant "factual matrix" of that 
case. Equity is here nothing other than the taking into 
account of a complex of historical and geographical 
circumstances the consideration of which does not diminish 
justice but, on the contrary, enriches it.
• • •
All the relevant circumstances are to be considered and 
balanced; they are to be thrown together into the crucible 
and their interaction will yield the correct equitable 
solution of each individual case.
The concepts of "equity" and "equitable" thus mandate that the
individual characteristics of developing countries to be taken
into account. At least one of the references in CERDS refers to
sharing benefits derived from natural resources, indicating that
contextual treatment is relevant both to environmental and non-
environmental issues.17
As is well-known, the NIEO resolutions contained several 
controversial elements, and the resolutions were not adopted 
unanimously. CERDS, for example, was approved by a vote of 120 
in favor, 6 opposed (including the United States), and 10
i oabstaining. Considerable literature exists about whether NIEO 
constitutes international law and, phrased differently, whether 
there exists an international right to development.*^ I will not 
attempt to resolve that debate in this article.
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Rather, I would point out that the dialogue about the 
importance and goals of the economic development effort now is 
phrased in terms of "sustainable development," as that term is 
used in the Report of the Brundtland Commission, and that, 
regardless of whether NIEO constitutes international law in a 
strict or "hard" sense, the vast majority of multilateral 
treaties since 1974 -- environmental and non-environmental -- 
have expressly referred to the needs of developing countries and 
frequently have made some specific provision for them.20  Time 
has not permitted either a complete perusal of all such 
conventions or of the accompanying opinio juris. It nevertheless 
seems possible to assert an existing or emerging customary 
international norm that international conventional regimes -- 
environmental and other —  should, as a general matter, take the 
interests of developing countries into account, even if the 
details of that consideration may be no more definable than by a 
reference to the obligation to take those interests into account 
in good faith -- the obligation of good faith being itself a
contextual norm.21
Such "soft" obligations raise several questions and have 
raised some objections. Indeed, soft law has been called the 
"Trojan horse of environmental law." Two issues should be 
distinguished: whether there is any legal obligation and whether
a legal obligation is defined in hard-edged terms.22 It seems to 
me that the obligation mentioned earlier in this paragraph is a 
legal obligation, not just a moral one, but that its content is
not hard-edged in its clarity and ease of application. In the 
latter sense only, therefore, can it be said to be soft law.
If NIEO has crystallized into customary law, for example in 
the express terms of CERDS, the obligation to provide either 
differential treatment or contextual treatment (the choice would 
depend on the issue) would be clear. CERDS article 30's 
requirement, quoted above, that environmental policies not 
adversely affect developing countries' development potential, 
would be especially pertinent.
B. International Human Rights
The post-World War II movement to establish and protect 
international human rights encompasses several rights directly 
related to environmental concerns. Article 1(3) of the United 
Nations Charter states as a purpose of the United Nations "To 
achieve international co-operation . . .  in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights . . ."; Article 55 states 
that "the United Nations shall promote . . . higher standards of
living . . ., solutions of international . . . health, and
related problems; and international cultural . . . cooperation";
and Article 56 pledges United Nations members to cooperate to
achieve the goals of Article 55.23  The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights provides that everyone: "is entitled to
realization, through national effort and international co­
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources 
of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
13
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personality" (art. 22); has the right to "just and favourable 
conditions of work" (art. 23); has the right to "a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his 
family" (art. 25); and has the right "freely to participate in 
the cultural life of the community" (art. 27).24 The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(the "Covenant") provides: that the members to the Covenant
"recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and 
favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular . . .
Safe and healthy working conditions" (art. 7); the right to "an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions" (art. 11(1)); the obligation to 
improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of 
food . . .  by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a 
way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization 
of natural resources" (art. 11(2)(a)); and that members 
"recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health" (art. 12(1)) 
and the obligation, in attempting to achieve that right, to take 
steps for "[t]he improvement of all aspects of environmental and 
industrial hygiene [and] [t]he prevention, treatment and control 
of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases" (art. 
12(2)(a),(b)).25
It thus is evident that there exist human rights to just and 
favourable conditions of work, an adequate standard of living, 
health, and participation in and enjoyment of the fruits of $
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culture. The human rights just enumerated clearly are related to 
the natural and cultural environment and have most probably 
passed beyond the stage of being only conventional norms to 
become customary international law.26 Some authors have even 
argued that there has evolved a human right to a clean and 
healthy environment.27
As a general matter, countries are required to work towards 
providing the rights enumerated in the three documents described 
above to their own nationals and to participate in international 
efforts to provide these rights to persons everywhere. 28This 
process is referred to as "progressive realization." However, 
the statement of countries' obligations contained in Article 2 of 
the Covenant -- which is the latest and most precise of the three 
documents —  is more exact. Each member is required to take 
steps "to the maximum of its available resources" (art. 2(1)). 
This is an example of contextual treatment. Article 2 continues 
to state: "Developing countries, with due regard to human rights
and their national economy, may determine to what extent they 
would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present 
Covenant to non-nationals."29 This is an example of differential 
treatment to developing countries, albeit differential treatment 
that does not place any obligation on developed countries. The 
Covenant thus supports both types of distinction examined in this 
paper.
In addition, if the rights described above are part of 
customary international law and if every country -- including 
developed countries -- has the obligation to participate
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internationally to achieve those rights for all people, including 
those in developing countries, there may be an obligation that 
developed countries assist developing countries in meeting 
international environmental norms. If so, this is another 
example of differential treatment for developing countries: the
differential treatment would be the obligation to provide 
financial, material, or technological aid to developing countries 
to help them satisfy international environmental standards.
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES SPECIFICALLY
RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT
Substantial dispute exists regarding whether there exist 
general customary norms relating to the environment and regarding 
the precise content of those norms, assuming they exist. For 
example, Professor Johan Lammers has compiled a partial list of 
principles or concepts that have been invoked to attack or defend 
the alleged legality under international law of instances of 
transboundary pollution; this partial list has 25 entries.30 
Nevertheless, there are some formulations of international 
environmental norms that would receive widespread, though not 
universal, approval. Four of those formulations are discussed 
below.
A. Reasonable and Equitable Use of a Shared Natural 
Resource
Under this principle, states are entitled, in their own 
territory, to "a reasonable and equitable share of the beneficial
16
uses of a transboundary natural r e s o u r c e . "31 This principle does 
not provide differential treatment to developing countries. But 
the determination of whether a particular use is "reasonable" 
takes into account all relevant facts and circumstances, 
including the social and economic needs and conditions of the 
states concerned.32 This principle, which is an example of 
contextual treatment, thus could result in different rights for 
use to two countries that are sharing a resource and that are 
similar in all ways except their development status.
B. State Responsibility for Causing Significant Injury 
to Another State's Environment or to Global Commons 
Many authorities agree that a state is responsible under 
international law if activities within its jurisdiction or 
control cause significant injury in or to the territory of 
another state. That principle was stated clearly by the 
international arbitral tribunal in the oft-cited Trail Smelter 
case:
[U]nder the principles of international law . . .  no State 
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in 
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the 
territory of another State or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 3
An aspect of this principle may also be found in the Corfu
Channel case: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated as
a "general and well-recognized principle," "every State's
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
contrary to the rights of other S t a t e s . I n  the Lake Lanoux
case, the ICJ discussed the general obligation to negotiate in
17
good faith and stated the requirement that a potential source
((upstream) state take "into consideration in a reasonable manner
the interests of the downstream S t a t e . "35The Trail Smelter 
principle was reaffirmed by implication in the Nuclear Tests
case, but there was no express statement of the rule.36
By their terms, none of these four cases require 
differential treatment of developing countries. The only 
apparent way in which the Trail Smelter case requires contextual 
treatment is the requirement that the "case [be of] serious 
consequence" -- a determination that presumably would vary 
according to the injured country's particular situation. The 
Lake Lanoux case, with its reference to "reasonable," clearly 
requires a contextual analysis.
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human  ̂
Environment contains a more generalized (i.e., not fume-specific) 
version of the Trail Smelter principle, but it expresses that 
principle in tandem with the principle that states have the right
to exploit their own natural resources:37
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and the principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control 
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
It is arguable that Principle 21 states a balancing test that
would weigh a state's right to exploit its resources against its
obligation not to cause transboundary harm and which thus would
necessitate a contextual analysis that presumably would consider
the importance of the right to the source (upstream) state and i
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the significance of the injury to the affected (downstream)
state. That appears to be the position of the United States:38
. . . Principle 21 . . . maintains a careful balance between
the sovereign right of a State to exploit its resources and 
its responsibility to avoid serious transboundary pollution. 
The principle does not purport to resolve (or even address) 
the issue of the extent to which the State's rights are 
circumscribed by its responsibility. As such, there must be 
a balancing between a State's right to act and another 
State's right not to be affected, on which there is no clear 
cut answer. This is consistent with a State's 
responsibility to exercise due diligence to avoid 
deleterious transboundary impacts on another. . . .
While that interpretation is not implausible, substantial
evidence exists that the better interpretation is that the
prohibition on causing transboundary harm is a limitation on a
state's right to exploit its resources. For example, the U.N.
General Assembly stated in December 1972 in the Resolution on
Cooperation between States in the Field of the Environment "That,
in the exploration, exploitation and development of their natural
resources, States must not produce significant harmful effects in
zones situated outside their national jurisdiction."39 Further
support for this interpretation is provided by the International
Law Association's 1986 Seoul Declaration, which does not
juxtapose the state's right to exploit its resources:40
The protection, preservation and enhancement of the natural 
environment for the present and future generations is the 
responsibility of all States. All States have the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. All States should co-operate in 
evolving international norms and regulations in the field.
Article 30 of CERDS, quoted above,^ provides additional support,
as does the Helsinki Final Act: " . . .  each of the
participating States, in accordance with the principles of
19
international law, ought to ensure . . . that activities carried
out on its territory do not cause degradation of the environment 
in another State or in areas lying beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction."42
Under this interpretation of Principle 21, which I believe 
to be correct, one contextual analysis would concern whether a 
particular harmful effect would be "significant" -- similar to 
the discussion above about the requirement of seriousness in the 
Trail Smelter principle. Other contextual aspects may also be 
present, depending on how closely the rule in Principle 21 is 
akin to a due care (or due diligence) standard, and on whether a 
state is responsible only if the harm is reasonably 
foreseeable.43 The latter inquiry would be contextual because of 
the reasonableness element. A due care (or due diligence) 
standard would be contextual because accountability would arise 
only if the source state acted or refrained from acting 
intentionally or negligently -- the determination of which 
requires a contextual analysis examining factors such as the 
nature of the activity, the potential harm, and the costs of 
preventing that harm (including benefits that would be foregone, 
for example if the activity were to cease altogether).44
Principle 21 does not mention developing countries, and does 
thus not provide differential treatment. Principle 23 of the 
Stockholm Declaration, however, does provide for such treatment, 
as well as providing individualized (contextual) treatment:4
Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed 
upon by the international community, or to standards which 
will have to be determined nationally, it will be essential 
in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in
20
each country, and the extent of the applicability of 
standards which are valid for the most advanced countries 
but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social 
cost for the developing countries.
Principle 23 thus is another example of state practice providing
differential treatment to developing countries and contextual
treatment.
The recent Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States contains contextual norms as its primary
international environmental rule:46
§ 601. State Obligations with Respect to Environment of 
Other States and the Common Environment
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may 
be necessary, to the extent practicable under the 
circumstances, to ensure that activities within its 
jurisdiction or control
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules 
and standards for the prevention, reduction, and 
control of injury to the environment of another 
state or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction; and
(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant 
injury to the environment of another state or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
(2) A state is responsible to all other states
(a) for any violation of its obligations under 
Subsection (l)(a), and
(b) for any significant injury, resulting from such 
violation, to the environment of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.
(3) A state is responsible for any significant injury, 
resulting from a violation of its obligations under 
Subsection (1), to the environment of another state or to 
its property, or to persons or property within that state's 
territory or under its jurisdiction or control.
The phrase in paragraph (1) "to the extent practicable under the
circumstances" clearly calls for a contextual analysis. The
requirement of "significant" injury in paragraphs (l)(b) and
(2)b) also necessitates a contextual analysis, as described
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above.47 Moreover, the Comments state that "In all cases [a 
defense is available if the] injury was due to the failure of the 
injured state to exercise reasonable care to avoid the threatened 
harm."48 Such a reasonableness standard calls for a contextual 
analysis. Section 601 and the accompanying Comments and 
Reporters' Notes do not provide any indication that differential 
treatment of developing countries is called for.
C. Obligation to Cooperate
Much authority exists for the proposition that states are 
obligated to cooperate in managing transboundary pollution. 
Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy has formulated this principle in the 
following terms:49
1. States have the obligation to co-operate, in a 
spirit of solidarity, with one another as well as with 
competent international organizations with a view to 
preventing, diminishing and eliminating transfrontier 
pollution.
2. To discharge this obligation, States inform and 
consult one another, in all good faith, on their activities 
or measures, undertaken or projected, that are likely to 
cause transfrontier pollution.
3. Without prejudice to paragraph 2 above, States 
inform one another on their respective pollution prevention 
policies, consult with one another about all questions 
likely to arise between them in connection with the 
management of their environments and take concerted action 
aimed at harmonizing their environmental policies.
No formulation of the obligation to cooperate with which I
am familiar requires, by its terms, differential treatment of
developing countries; but it seems to me that the exact form
cooperation takes in a particular situation must necessarily be
contextual, i.e., that what is appropriate and required will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each transboundary
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situation. For example, the kind of information or technical 
assistance the United States might be obligated to give to Canada 
regarding a particular transboundary threat might vary from that 
required to be provided to Mexico in an otherwise similar 
situation because of differences in language, technical 
expertise, regulatory experience, cultural patterns, agricultural 
practices and products, ecosystem susceptibilities, climate 
patterns, etc.
D. The Duty to Compensate for Transboundary Harm Even When 
the Activity Causing the Harm Is Permitted to Continue 
by International Law
Situations requiring compensation but in which the harmful 
activity is permitted to continue, are the subject of controversy 
regarding whether they are covered by the principle of state 
responsibility discussed in part III.B, above, or whether they 
are governed by a different form of state accountability, usually 
referred to as "international l i a b i l i t y ."50 That dispute is, by 
and large, irrelevant to this paper because proponents of both 
positions agree that there are some situations in which states 
are accountable to compensate another state for transboundary 
environmental harm even though the harmful activity is allowed by 
international law to continue.51 Indeed, the Trail Smelter case 
is an example of exactly that situation: the tribunal held that
Canada must compensate the United States for any future damage 
that occurred even after the smelter was brought into compliance 
with the minimum operating standards set by the tribunal.52
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One element of the forementioned dispute that is relevant is 
the question of what standard should be applied in determining 
whether a situation exists requiring compensation but allowing 
the harmful activity to continue. Some argue that the 
appropriate standard is one of strict (or absolute) liability for 
ultrahazardous activities. 53On its face, that standard requires 
neither differential treatment nor contextual treatment. On 
closer analysis, however, it seems to me that a contextual 
analysis is called for, because otherwise how can it be 
determined either that an activity is or is not ultrahazardous 
(presumably, activities' dangers vary according to realistic 
appraisals of factors such as operating conditions and operator 
skills) or that its social worth justifies its continuance in
54spite of the harm it is causing.
Others argue that accountability for injury from acts that 
are nevertheless permitted to continue by international law is 
(or should be) based on a contextual analysis taking into account 
a wide variety of factors, and encompasses (or should encompass) 
activities that are not ultrahazardous. An example of this view 
is the approach of the U.N. International Law Commission (ILC) 
with respect to "international liability for injurious 
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international 
law." According to the work of the first Special Rapporteur, 
Robert Quentin Quentin-Baxter, if transboundary harm with a 
physical consequence occurs and if no governing conventional 
regime has been agreed to, the states involved must negotiate in 
good faith to determine their rights and obligations, and
reparations are required unless that would be inconsistent with 
the states' shared expectations. The amount of reparations (if 
required) is to be determined by balance-of-interests tests, 
possibly taking into account the states' previous behavior, their 
shared expectations, and several specified "principles," 
"factors," and " m a t t e r s . 55 contextual analysis clearly was 
required. In addition, though Professor Quentin-Baxter did not 
expressly call for differential treatment for developing 
countries, some of the variables to be considered were most 
probably directed at ensuring that particular characteristics of 
developing countries be considered. For example, "standards of 
adequate protection should be determined with due regard to the 
importance of the activity and its economic viability [and] 
should take into account the means at the disposal of the acting 
State . . . . "56
The ILC's approach to the international liability topic has 
shifted under the current (second) Special Rapporteur, Julio 
Barboza. Ambassador Barboza proposed ten draft articles in 1988 
that do not concur precisely with Professor Quentin-Baxter's 
approach. They do appear to contain contextual elements and to 
be directed at protecting developing countries. The draft 
articles apply only to activities that create an "appreciable 
risk of causing transboundary injury," and "risk" is to be 
determined with reference to whether the relevant substance's 
physical properties, "considered either intrinsically or in 
relation to the place, environment or way in which they are used, 
make them highly likely to cause transboundary injury . . . ."57
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The explanation and examples of this determination do not suggest 
a broad contextual analysis, nor do they contain aspects that 
relate characteristically to developing countries, but neither do 
they expressly exclude consideration of such factors.58 That 
such factors might be relevant is suggested by other parts of the 
draft and the accompanying commentary. Article 3, for example, 
states that the draft's obligations apply to a state only if "it
c qknew or had means of knowing" of a potentially injurious act.
In explaining this article, Ambassador Barboza states that "its 
primary aim is to protect developing countries, which sometimes 
lack the means to be aware of everything that goes on within 
their territory . . . ."60 other draft provisions requiring a
contextual analysis but whose terms do not provide differential 
treatment, are those regarding the obligations to cooperate in |
good faith, to prevent injury, and to make reparations.61
IV. CONVENTIONAL REGIMES DEALING WITH TRANSBOUNDARY
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
As indicated above, it has become common for multilateral 
conventions of all types at least to mention the need to take 
into account the needs of developing countries, and many 
conventions have gone further to provide either differential 
treatment or contextual treatment. In this part, I describe 
several multilateral environmental conventions with respect to 
whether they provide differential or contextual treatment. Time 
has not permitted a full examination of all multilateral 
environmental treaties, but I believe that the selection herein $
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is representative of such treaties. At the least, it provides 
examples of some of the most important normative responses to the 
Third World's situation. The conventions are examined 
chronologically.
A. 1972 Convention on the International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects
This Convention does not specifically mention developing 
countries or provide differential treatment to them; indeed 
article 2 specifies a standard of absolute liability on the part 
of the launching state.62 Two norms, however, are contextual. 
Article 10 deals with time limits on making claims; it allows an 
extension of up to one year after the date the injured state 
"could reasonably be expected to have learned of the facts." 
Perhaps more significantly, article 12 states that the amount of 
compensation that is due "shall be determined in accordance with 
international law and the principles of justice and equity." The 
reference to "justice and equity" presumably calls for a 
contextual analysis.63 But that analysis may be limited by the 
further statement in article 12 that the compensation should 
"restore [the injured person] to the condition which would have 
existed if the damage had not occurred."
The Space Object Liability Convention thus contains both 
contextual and absolute norms. The contextual norms -- 
"reasonably be expected" and "justice and equity" —  are 
objective rather than subjective, i.e., they depend on the 
perspective not of the acting State or of the injured State, but
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rather on a perspective external to those States. On the other 
hand, it seems highly probable that the individual 
characteristics, knowledge, and motives of the States involved 
would be taken into account in making that external analysis.
The norms thus effectively take into account relevant differences 
between developed and developing countries. The absence of 
differential norms, which would be another way of considering 
those differences, is notable; this Convention antedated by two 
years the formal call for NIEO.
B. The World Heritage Convention
The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage does not mention developing 
countries per se, but it states in its Preamble that national 
protection of natural and cultural heritage "often remains 
incomplete because of . . . the insufficient economic, scientific
and technical resources of the country where the property [is]" 
and that it is "incumbent on the international community . . .  to 
grant[] collective assistance . . . ."64 That obligation to 
provide assistance is elaborated in the Convention's normative 
provisions. Article 6 "recognize[s] the duty of the 
international community to cooperate" and, more specifically, 
that each member state "undertakes to give help" if requested to 
by the state in which the heritage is located. (As indicated in 
the following paragraph, article 4 is unusual in that it imposes 
a reciprocal duty to utilize any assistance which the state in 
which the heritage is located "may be able to obtain.") Article
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7 states the understanding that international protection of
natural and cultural heritage includes establishing "a system of 
international cooperation and assistance." Article 13(4) 
provides that the World Heritage Committee established by the 
Convention shall determine its priorities with reference to, 
inter alia, the resources and capabilities of the states in which 
threatened heritage is located. And Article 21 provides that the 
World Heritage Committee should evaluate requests for assistance 
from the Fund established by Convention with respect, inter alia, 
to the "reasons why the resources of the State requesting 
assistance do not allow it to meet all the expenses." Although 
the obligations do not by their terms benefit only developing 
countries, the Preamble indicates a sensitivity to the need to 
assist developing countries in protecting heritage (together with 
dealing with the fact that many situations such as protecting 
natural heritage shared by more than one country, require 
international efforts).
The Convention also contains many examples of contextual 
norms that are fairly obviously directed at taking account of 
countries' differing capabilities and resources. For example, 
some provisions contain contextual norms that turn specifically 
on the state's capabilities and resources. Article 4, which 
contains the Convention's general duty to identify, protect, 
conserve, present, and transmit heritage to future generations, 
provides that each state "will do all it can to this end, to the 
utmost of its own resources and, where appropriate, with any 
international assistance and cooperation . . .  it may be able to
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obtain." Article 5, which elaborates on that general duty, 
obligates each state to endeavor to reach specified goals "in so 
far as possible, and as appropriate for each country."
Similarly, the obligation in Article 11 to provide a heritage 
inventory only extends "in so far as possible."
The World Heritage Convention thus effectively takes the 
situation of developing countries into account by providing a 
duty to assist -- apparently balanced by a duty to seek 
assistance -- and by invoking contextual norms taking into 
account factors characteristically of concern to developing 
countries, such as the amount of available resources and 
protective capabilities more generally.
C. 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
CITES is an attempt to protect endangered species by 
regulating international trade in those species -- primarily via 
prohibiting trade in certain endangered species except under 
specified circumstances, requiring any export, re-export, or 
import of those species to occur only pursuant to a permit 
system, requiring any trade to occur under conditions designed to 
ensure the survival of the specimen, and returning specimens 
traded in violation of the Convention.65 CITES neither 
specifically refers to developing countries nor provides 
differential treatment to them in any other fashion.
Almost all obligations in CITES are stated in absolute 
terms. The only expressly contextual norms are found in articles
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8 and 13. Paragraph 1 of Article 8, which is critical to CITES 
because it contains the parties' basic obligation, provides that 
parties "shall take appropriate measures" to enforce the 
Convention and to prohibit trade in violation thereof. Paragraph 
3 of article 8 states that parties shall process specimens with a 
minimum of delay "[a]s far as possible." Article 13(2) provides 
that parties should respond to inquiries from the Secretariat 
established by CITES "as soon as possible." The references to 
"possible" indicate a contextual norm that takes into account 
resources and regulatory and other capabilities. The meaning of 
the term "appropriate" in article 8(1) is less clear. Time has 
not permitted examining the travaux preparatoire. On its face, 
"appropriate" seems to require a contextual analysis: how else
would one determine whether a particular action fit a particular 
situation. Whether that term would allow a less effective action 
to be taken because of the characteristics of or resources 
available to the actor (as would be allowed by the World Heritage 
Convention), is less obvious.
Unless "appropriate" does allow a contextual analysis 
sensitive to the conditions in developing countries, CITES is 
somewhat unusual in stating its major obligations virtually 
entirely in absolute terms. This situation may have arisen 
because the official actions required (e.g., export and import 
control) were thought to be well within the competence of 
developing and developed countries alike, or because the 
interests sought to be protected by CITES were viewed as being of 
very high priority (perhaps especially to some developing
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countries, such as Kenya, Tanzania, India, China). The travaux r
preparatoire may contain answers to these questions. It must 
also be recalled that CITES, like the World Heritage Convention, 
was drafted before 1974, when NIEO first was officially and 
formally recognized.
D. 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution, and the Accompanying Resolution and 
Declaration
This Convention was drafted and adopted within the framework 
of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).66 Also adopted 
were a Resolution on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution^ and 
a Declaration on Low- and Non-Waste Technology and Re-Utilization 
and Recycling of Wastes.68 Although the ECE has only 34 members, | 
the Convention is of general interest because it was the first 
major multilateral effort to combat transboundary air pollution.
The Convention and Resolution do not specifically mention 
developing countries or provide them differential treatment. The 
preamble to the Convention refers to "the pertinent provisions" 
of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. The only principle 
specifically mentioned is Principle 21; but the Stockholm 
Conference was so permeated by the question of how developing 
countries should be treated that a reference to that issue 
probably should be inferred. Even such an inference falls short 
of differential treatment, of course. The 1979 Waste 
Declaration, however, recommends in paragraph 5(b) that 
international cooperative activities occur within the framework (
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of ECE to exchange scientific and technical information "taking 
into account the interests of ECE countries that are developing 
from an economic point of view."
The Convention contains numerous contextual norms that are 
either implicitly or explicitly sensitive to economic 
development. Article 2 states that the parties are determined to 
protect man and the environment against air pollution and "shall 
endeavor to limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and 
prevent air pollution . . . ." Article 4 also includes an
obligation (regarding information exchange and policy review) 
modified by the words "as far as possible." Article 6 commits 
parties "to develop the best policies and strategies [and] 
control measures compatible with balanced development, in 
particular by using the best available technology which is 
economically feasible" (emphasis supplied). Article 7 requires 
parties to initiate and cooperate in research or development 
regarding six areas "as appropriate to [the party's] needs."
The Resolution includes contextual elements in paragraph 1 
to implement the Convention even before it is in force "to the 
maximum extent possible" and in paragraph 4 to limit air 
pollution "as far as possible." The Declaration contains one 
such provision in paragraph 5(d), stating that certain 
educational programs be self-supporting "as far as possible."
The Convention, as well as its accompanying Resolution and 
Declaration, thus contain a variety of contextual rules, most 
probably demonstrating sensitivity to the condition of developing 
countries and to the practical realities facing air-pollution-
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control efforts generally. The Declaration also calls for 
differential treatment of developing countries in one area.
E. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)
6 9UNCLOS  was the product of years of negotiations that
continuously considered the claims, interests, and political
70significance of developing countries. u  The Preamble speaks not 
only of the "equitable and efficient utilization of the 
resources" of the seas and the "realization of a just and 
equitable international economic order," but also to "tak[ing] 
into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, 
in particular, the special interests and needs of developing 
countries, whether coastal or land-locked" (emphasis supplied).
UNCLOS provides a series of environmental norms specific to 
particular aspects or areas covered by the Convention. Most make 
no mention of developing countries. Article 192 provides the 
general obligation: "States have the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment." Articles 194 (Measures to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment), 
195 (Duty not to transfer damage or hazards or transform one type 
of pollution into another), 196 (Use of technologies or 
introduction of alien or new species), 197 (Co-operation on a 
global or regional basis), 198 (Notification of imminent or 
actual damage), 199 (Contingency plans against pollution), 200 
(Studies, research programmes and exchange of information and 
data), 201 (Scientific criteria for regulations), 204 (Monitoring
of the risks or effects of pollution), 205 (Publication of 
reports), 206 (Assessment of potential effects of activities), 
213-222 (the enforcement provisions), 223-233 (Safeguards), 234 
(ice-covered areas), and 235 (Responsibility and liability), deal 
with other aspects of environmental protection but make no 
mention of developing countries.
Most of the articles that cover specific sources of 
pollution also do not provide differential treatment, including 
article 208 (Pollution from sea-bed activities subject to 
national jurisdiction), 209 (Pollution from activities in the 
deep seabed -- see also article 145), 210 (Pollution by dumping), 
211 (Pollution from vessels), and 212 (Pollution from or through 
the atmosphere). However, article 207 (Pollution from land-based 
sources) provides that states, in endeavoring to establish 
regional and global approaches, shall "tak[e] into account 
characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of 
developing States and their need for economic development."
(Some of these articles provide that policies are to be 
harmonized on a regional basis (articles 207(3) and 208(4)), 
which is related to claims by developed countries.7 1 )
There is another aspect of marine environmental protection 
regarding which UNCLOS provides differential treatment: 
assistance in meeting environmental norms. Article 202 obligates 
states to provide scientific, educational, technical and other 
assistance for the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, to "provide appropriate assistance, especially to 
developing States," to minimize the effects of major incidents,
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and to "provide appropriate assistance, especially to developing 
States," concerning preparation of environmental assessments 
(emphasis supplied). Article 203 further provides that 
developing countries be granted preference by international 
organizations in allocating funds and technical assistance and 
utilizing specialized services. The general scheme is thus that 
UNCLOS's environmental standards do not provide differential 
treatment to developing countries except (1) with respect to one 
aspect of land-based pollution and (2) that they require 
developed countries and, to a lesser extent, international 
organizations to assist developing countries in meeting those 
standards.
Many of the foregoing provisions involve contextual norms.
Most significantly, article 194, which specifies measures to
prevent, reduce and control marine pollution, provides that:^
States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, 
all measures consistent with this Convention that are 
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment from any source, using for this purpose 
the best practicable means at their disposal and in 
accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavor 
to harmonize their policies in this connection.
(Emphasis supplied.) Article 207(4) expressly directs that the
economic capacity of developing countries and their need to
develop be considered, as indicated above.
UNCLOS thus requires differential treatment and contextual
treatment. The predominant approach, however, is to eschew
differential treatment in favor of contextual treatment, except
in the provisions regarding pollution from land-based sources and
assistance to developing countries from other states and from 
international organizations.
F. 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer
The Montreal Protocol773 gives specific substance to the more 
general provisions of the Vienna Convention.74 The Vienna 
Convention Preamble refers to "the circumstances and particular 
requirements of developing countries." Article 2, which contains 
the Convention's general obligations, provides that parties 
"shall, in accordance with the means at their disposal and their 
capabilities," undertake certain measures. Article 4, which 
elaborates regarding legal, scientific, and technical 
cooperation, provides that states shall cooperate in promoting 
the development and transfer of technology, "taking into account 
in particular the needs of the developing countries." The 
Convention thus contains differential treatment and contextual 
treatment.
The Montreal Protocol follows the Vienna Convention in those 
respects. The Preamble "[a]cknowledg[es] that special provision 
is required to meet the needs of developing countries for 
[substances that cause depletion of the ozone layer]," and it 
speaks of the need "to control equitably total global emissions 
of [such substances]." Article 10 provides a duty to cooperate 
in promoting technical assistance that is to "tak[e] into account 
in particular the needs of developing countries," and it states 
that workplans "shall pay special attention to the needs and
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circumstances of the developing countries." Article 2 provides 
the basic obligations of the Protocol to control consumption and 
production of specified ozone-depleting substances, referred to 
as "controlled substances." Article 2, by reference to article 
5, distinguishes between developing countries whose annual 
consumption of controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms 
(two-thirds of a pound) per capita -- which includes virtually 
all developing countries -- and all other countries.
Countries not meeting the developing country/0.3 kg. test 
are required by article 2 to freeze their consumption of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) for each 12-month period at 1986 
levels; production of CFCs must be frozen at 1986 levels except a 
10 percent increase is permitted to satisfy needs of states 
meeting the developing country/0.3 kg. test or for industrial 
rationalization (which involves transfer of production from one 
party to another and thus no net increase in production); 
consumption must be reduced 20 percent by 1994, and a further 30 
percent by 1999 (a total of 50 percent); and production must be 
decreased by similar amounts, with a possible upward variation of 
10 percent allowed on the same grounds mentioned above. The 
consumption and production of halons (the other major group of 
ozone-depleting substances covered by the Protocol) are to be 
frozen at 1986 levels, again with an increase of 10 percent 
allowed for the reasons mentioned above. These countries thus 
must freeze and, for CFCs, reduce their consumption and 
production, with a net increase in production possible only to 
meet needs of developing countries.
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Countries that do meet the developing country/0.3 kg. test 
are treated quite differently, and at least ostensibly more 
favorably. Article 5 allows such countries to delay compliance 
with the standards in article 2 by 10 years, as long as it does 
so to meet domestic needs and as long as it does not exceed the 
0.3 kg. threshold. Flexible measurement methods are also 
allowed.
Article 5 thus provides differential treatment in that it 
allows developing/0.3 kg. countries to avoid reductions and 
freezes required of all other parties. But there is another 
perspective: developing/0.3 kg. countries cannot exceed a per
capita annual consumption of 0.3 kg., whereas many developed 
countries are so high above that level now that they will exceed 
it many times over even after reducing their consumption by 50 
percent. The benefits available from CFC and halon use will thus 
not be available to developing countries to the same extent they 
have been and will be available to such developed countries.
There is another instance in which developing countries may 
be seen to be disadvantaged by the Protocol. Article 2(b) allows 
a country not meeting the developing country/0.3 kg. test to add 
to 1986 production any facilities that are under construction or 
contracted for by Sept. 16, 1987 (the date the Protocol was 
signed) and that were provided for in national legislation (e.g., 
a five-year plan), as long as they are completed by December 31, 
1990 and the production does not raise the party's per capita 
consumption above 0.5 kg. The principal beneficiary of this
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it might also have been
♦
7 5provision appears to be the U.S.S.R.; 
beneficial to some developing countries.
V. CONCLUSION
Powerful political, practical, and moral reasons exist to 
involve developing countries in the effort to protect the 
biosphere and to fashion policies and legal norms that will 
promote, or at least avoid hampering, the effort to improve the 
standard of living of present and future generations of 
individuals living in those countries.
Such legal norms can take three general forms. One form is 
to provide what I refer to as differential treatment to 
developing countries per se, i.e., the norm by its terms can 
provide different treatment to developing countries. The second |
form is what I call contextual treatment, i.e., the norm, without 
specifically mentioning developing countries, requires or allows 
consideration of factors that typically vary according to the 
economic-development situation in a country. The third general 
form of norm is what I refer to as absolute norms, i.e., norms 
that do not differentiate between developing and developed 
countries and that do not require or allow contextual treatment.
Norms providing differential treatment or contextual 
treatment can be directed at, or have the effect of, benefiting 
developing countries in a variety of ways. For example, they 
can: impose additional burdens on developed countries or 
international organizations vis-a-vis developing countries; 
require that future conventional regimes take developing f
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countries' interests into account; provide lower standards of 
care for developing countries than are required for developed 
countries; or require developing countries to pay less in 
compensation (or other forms of reparation) than would be 
required of otherwise similarly situated developed countries.
Such norms -- particularly those providing differential treatment 
-- may also have the perhaps unintended effect of disadvantaging 
developing countries. Absolute norms might conceivably be 
constructed so as to benefit developing countries, but my 
preliminary research has not revealed any examples of that.
Although absolute norms predominate, the contemporary 
international legal system is replete with differential norms and 
contextual norms. Instances of each type occur in the evolving 
and interconnected areas of economic-development, human-rights, 
and environmental law. Indeed, there probably is an existing 
general customary obligation, stemming primarily from state 
practice in those three areas, to take the effect on economic 
development in developing countries into account -- in order to 
foster, or at least avoid interfering with, such development -- 
when fashioning international environmental norms. If such a 
norm is not already de lata, it is de ferenda (in the process of 
coming into existence).
The most important customary international environmental 
principles already contain a contextual element, although this is 
not always expressed. The conventional environmental regimes 
examined in this paper reflect widely differing resolutions of 
the desirability of providing standards sensitive to disparities
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in economic development and contain various mixtures of absolute, 
differential, and contextual norms. Those differences presumably 
reflect the different types of behavior and threats with which 
the regimes were concerned, and thus are not to be deplored. 
Indeed, such a rich menu of possible approaches should be 
welcomed, as long as the underlying concern for the social and 
economic well-being of present and future generations of 
individuals throughout the world is the predominant factor in 
choosing which approach is most appropriate for a particular 
situation.
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